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K, MRS K AGAINST CHIEF CONSTABLE OF THE POLICE SERVICE OF SCOTLAND [2019] ScotCS CSOH_9 (31 January 2019)
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[2019] ScotCS CSOH_9
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OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2019] CSOH 9
A63/15
OPINION OF LORD BRAILSFORD
In the cause
MRS K
Pursuer
against
SIR STEPHEN HOUSE, CHIEF CONSTABLE OF THE POLICE SERVICE OF SCOTLAND
Defender
31 January 2019
Pursuer: McBrearty QC, Campbell; BTO Solicitors
Defender: Shand QC, Smart; Clyde & Co
[1] This was an action of damages instituted by a former police officer against the Chief
Constable for The Police Service of Scotland in which it was alleged that there was a failure
to take reasonable care by Police Scotland in duties owed to their employees. The case for
the pursuer as pled on record set forth a list of duties said to be incumbent upon the
defender but as developed and presented at proof was ultimately limited to the following
averments of duty:
“It was the defender’s predecessor’s duty to take reasonable care for the safety of its
employees, including the pursuer, and to avoid exposing them unnecessarily to the
risk of injury.” (closed record 18B)
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“It was their duty to afford her fair treatment in carrying out an investigation into
her conduct and performance and to support her in her move to another department.
It was their duty not to take disciplinary action against her or to move her
permanently from her post without affording her fair treatment. The duties to afford
the pursuer fair treatment as aforesaid required the defenders, amongst other
things;… (ii) not to move her from her post, in particular, not to do so on the basis of
preliminary findings which had not been the subject of proper investigations which
she had not been made aware of and not had the opportunity to respond to; (iii) to
advise her that her post had been re-advertised and provide her with an explanation
therefor…”(closed record 18C-E)
[2] Proof was restricted to liability and causation. The pursuer gave evidence on her
own behalf and adduced the evidence of nine further witnesses. The defenders did not lead
evidence.
Pursuer’s evidence
[3] The pursuer joined the then Grampian Police Force (“Grampian”) in 1990 as a
probationary police officer serving in that rank until February 1992, at which time she was
awarded the Baton of Honour as the most outstanding officer on basic probationer training.
She then commenced uniform duties in Aberdeen serving in that capacity until October 1994
when she was moved to CID duties within the same city. Between March 1995 and
November 1998 her service was with the Drug Squad in the city, during which period she
was awarded a prize for the best student in detective training. In 1997 she undertook a test
purchasing course, completion of which permitted her to undertake work making test
purchases of illegal drugs in a covert capacity. In October 1998 she completed the
appropriate training and became a qualified undercover officer. She was promoted to
detective sergeant in 2000. Between 1998 and 2003 she was employed either within the
Grampian Police Force Intelligence Section or as an undercover police officer working both
within the UK and abroad. The pursuer’s evidence was that she spent the majority of her
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working time on undercover duties. In July 2003, whilst deployed as an undercover officer,
the pursuer became seriously ill, required hospital admission and operative treatment. As a
result she was absent from work until November 2005. On her return to work she was
assigned to Grampian Police Force Special Branch where she worked until September 2007
when she was seconded to the Special Operations Unit (“SOU”) of the Scottish Drug
Enforcement Agency (“SCDEA”). Her unchallenged evidence was that all police officers
working in SCDEA were seconded from other police forces and during their time in SCDEA
remained formally officers of the parent force.
[4] The pursuer gave evidence in relation to her health in the period from her joining the
police until her secondment to the SCDEA in 2007. Following the death of her mother in
1997 she suffered a period of depression which continued till April 1999 and required the
prescription of medication. This matter was discussed with Grampian Police Occupational
Health Department in October 1997 and a note was made of contributing factors associated
with the death of her mother and work related stresses.1
[5] As already recorded the pursuer developed a serious illness in 2003. As a
consequence of this illness she suffered from symptoms of anxiety and again developed
depression of sufficient severity to require medical intervention and the prescription of
appropriate drugs.
[6] The pursuer attended regular sessions at least once annually with a clinical
psychologist, Mary Keenan Ross, from 1998 until 2013. These sessions were facilitated and
paid for by her employer.
1 PDF371. All productions were provided in PDF format on disc. Each page of text being given a
page number. These were reproduced in hard copy for the proof in five lever arch folders, each page
having a number corresponding to the PDF numbering. For convenience the PDF numbering will be
adopted herein.
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[7] In September 2007 the pursuer was seconded to the SOU of SCDEA. The personal
records of SCDEA relative to the pursuer, although a little difficult to follow, describe her
position for dates between 2009-2011 as a “permanent posting”.2
[8] The pursuer’s role in SOU within SCDEA was initially of a Test Purchase
Coordinator. This involved the coordination and supporting of test purchase operations
throughout Scotland. It further involved the organisation of training for test purchasers and
her involvement as an active member of the National Undercover Working Group. In the
course of her work with SCDEA the pursuer worked with another police officer within the
SOU, Detective Sergeant G (“DSG”) a secondee to the unit from Strathclyde Police Force.
DSG had been employed in SOU as the Regional Operational Support Sergeant since about
2003, as such he was responsible for the majority of banking arrangements and financial
reconciliation within the unit. SOU made use of covert premises, vehicles, bank accounts,
mail boxes and companies in order to facilitate covert operations. Banking arrangements
were required in order to facilitate and fund such operations.
[9] When the pursuer commenced employment with SOU in 2007 it was based in
Osprey House in Paisley. At this time the pursuer owned a residential property in
Aberdeen. Her evidence was that prior to commencing work with SCDEA management
within the agency offered her accommodation to use when she was working in Paisley
within a covert flat in the Strathclyde region rented by SCDEA. The offer was accepted. At
a later stage again with the knowledge and cooperation of SCDEA management she moved
into another covert flat rented by SCDEA. Her position was that during her time in SCDEA
she resided either in her own property in Aberdeen, covert flats rented by SCDEA in
2 PDF1223
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Glasgow or in a property owned by members of her family in Glasgow. She also indicated
that her work within SCDEA involved travel throughout the UK, and indeed abroad. In
2009 the office occupied by the pursuer and DSG in Osprey House was relocated to another
location. After this the pursuer indicated that both herself and DSG would regularly work
at an offsite covert premise ostensibly maintained as business premises. Occasionally she
would “hot desk” at Osprey House. This working arrangement was known to the pursuer’s
managers who regularly attended at the covert premises she was working from.
[10] In relation to the period between 2007-10 the pursuer stated that she both enjoyed
her work with SCDEA and performed at a high level. She maintained that this was reflected
in appraisals by superior officers made in connection with an application for a competency
based salary payment in 20083 and a staff appraisal in February 2010.4
[11] In or about April 2010 Detective Inspector Danny Rae (“DI Rae”) was seconded to
SOU and assumed responsibility as the pursuer’s supervisor. Confirmation of the pursuer’s
recollection of the date when DI Rae assumed responsibility as her supervisor is to be found
in an SCDEA note for a special operations enquiry briefing dated 6 July 2011.5 DI Rae
instituted a number of changes in the operation of SOU. One change involved the exchange
of roles between the pursuer and DSG. The change required a transfer of information
relating to banking arrangements and financial details pertaining to the funding of covert
operations between the pursuer and DSG. The tenor of the pursuer’s evidence was that DSG
was somewhat obstructive in cooperating with the exchange of roles with her. She did,
3 PDF pages 1120-25
4 PDF1237/1240
5 PDF1845
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however, consider at the time that she had been informed by DSG of the full details of bank
accounts and financial arrangements used to facilitate covert operations operated by SOU.
[12] In August 2010 a covert flat often used as a residence by the pursuer was broken
into. On being informed by uniformed police of the break in the pursuer reported that
property owned by both her and SCDEA had been stolen. Approximately two weeks later
the pursuer recalled that she had stored personal jewellery in the covert flat, it was missing
and she thought it had been stolen in the break in. She made a further report of that theft.
She placed a value on the jewellery stolen in excess of £5,000. She prepared a memo for
SCDEA about the incident. After submission of this memo SCDEA made a proposal to
reimburse her for lost property, primarily the jewellery, in the sum of £2,500. Shortly after
receiving this offer the pursuer discovered the jewellery she thought had been stolen from
the covert premises in her flat in Aberdeen. This was again reported to SCDEA with an
apology on the part of the pursuer. She said she was embarrassed by her mistake. She
received no payment from SCDEA in respect of the jewellery. There has never been any
suggestion of any wrongdoing on the pursuer’s part in respect of this incident made by
SCDEA or, for that matter, any other police unit.
[13] After having assumed responsibility for supervising the pursuer DI Rae formed the
view that her residing, when working in Paisley, in covert premises was unfair to her. He
considered that requiring her to maintain a covert identity whilst outwith work constituted
an unfair burden. He therefore recommended that she relocate from Aberdeen to Glasgow.
That recommendation was approved by superior officers and subsequently the pursuer sold
her house in Aberdeen and relocated to Glasgow in December 2010. She received financial
assistance from SCDEA in respect of the relocation.
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[14] DSG’s secondment with SCDEA was due to expire in or around April 2011. He was
due to go on annual leave on 5 April 2011. Prior to that date he received notice that his
secondment would come to an end immediately upon his return to duties following leave.
DSG sought to extend the period of his secondment and made submissions to his superiors
DI Rae and Superintendent Ian Thomas on this matter. As a result of these representations
his secondment was extended by three months. On 6 April 2011 DSG went on annual leave.
On that date the pursuer, in the routine exercise of her duties, attended at a covert mail box
hitherto operated and supervised by DSG. She collected a bundle of unopened mail from
the mailbox. When she opened the mail she found bank statements and mobile phone bills
in names which were unknown to her. She also found two debt collectors’ letters. She
immediately attempted to speak with DI Rae on the phone but could not contact him. She
accordingly attended at Osprey House and told DI Rae what she had discovered. She then
attended the offsite premises that she had been using as an office with DSG. She indicated
that the offsite premises gave the appearance of having been “ransacked”. She found boxes
and bags of unopened documents and mail. She found evidence that some documents had
been shredded. Material present included documents relating to pseudonyms unknown to
the pursuer such as bank cards, mobile phone bills, letters from debt collectors and
passports. Amounts of cash were also found in the premises. It was the pursuer’s position
that none of these items had been present when she had last been in the offsite premises.
The pursuer was unaware of any operational reason which would explain the existence of
the items concerned. The pursuer’s evidence was that she was very concerned about what
she had found. The pursuer again attended at the covert premises on 7 April, this time
accompanied by DI Rae. The pursuer’s views on what she had discovered in the premises
were echoed by DI Rae. He gave evidence of what he discovered at the premises as
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constituting “a total disaster”. The pursuer was concerned that the operations of SOU and
SCDEA were compromised with potential safety implications for officers employed within
the units, a view which DI Rae shared. DI Rae contacted his superiors, Superintendent Ian
Thomas (“Supt Thomas”) and Chief Inspector James Reid (“Ch Insp Reid”) who attended
the covert premises on the same day (7 April). The pursuer’s evidence was that during the
visit Supt Thomas became angry. He kicked a chair in the direction of the pursuer and
asserted that she “must have known about this”. The pursuer stated to the Superintendent
that she had no knowledge. Her understanding at the time was that Supt Thomas had
accepted her explanation. There was no doubt in the mind of the pursuer that all senior
management within SCDEA, including the head of the intelligence department, Chief
Superintendent Stephen Whitelock (“Ch Supt Whitelock”), regarded the situation which had
been uncovered as extremely serious and to constitute a significant risk of comprising the
work of the units.
[15] Senior management of SCDEA tasked DI Rae and the pursuer to immediately assess
the full extent of the situation and to attempt to rectify problems, including the paying off of
debts which had been incurred either for or ostensibly for covert operations. Fulfilling this
task involved the pursuer in the following 8-10 weeks working very long hours exclusively
on this task.
[16] On or about 14 April 2011 DSG returned from annual leave and had a meeting with
senior officers in relation to the findings in the covert office. It was the pursuer’s
understanding that he accepted responsibility for the failings which had been discovered. It
was also the pursuer’s understanding that DSG, in addition to accepting his responsibility,
had indicated to DI Rae that the pursuer had neither been involved nor had any knowledge
of any of the matters which had been uncovered. I record at this point that the pursuer’s
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understanding as regards DSG was never challenged, nor was it rebutted in any other
evidence led at proof. Following the meeting between DSG and his superiors on 14 April
the pursuer was tasked to support him and in particular drive him from Osprey House
where the meeting had taken place to Central Station in Glasgow. It was the pursuer’s view
that in the course of the journey DSG appeared unstable and distressed. He was admitted to
a psychiatric unit on or around 15 April 2011. At this point the pursuer was delegated as his
welfare contact and required to visit him in hospital as well as liaising with his family. She
was not pleased at having been given this task which she considered inappropriate in
circumstances where she was the officer who had uncovered wrongdoing on the part of
DSG. DSG never returned to work for the police and was subsequently granted ill health
retirement.
[17] An internal investigation within SCDEA was instituted to be conducted by the
Professional Standards Unit (“PSU”) within the authority. The officer leading the
investigation was Detective Inspector Alastair Thomson (“DI Thomson”). On 19 April 2011
the pursuer was required to attend an interview with the investigation. Prior to this
interview the pursuer was informed by DI Rae that Supt Thomas had told him that she [the
pursuer] “should remember what side her bread was buttered on”. She maintained that
Supt Thomas repeated this statement directly to her. The pursuer’s position was that while
she did not understand why this comment was made she construed it as a threat. The
interview was conducted by two Detective Sergeants of the PSU in Kirkintilloch Police
Station. It lasted for a period of approximately two and a half days. It was conducted in a
room ordinarily used for interviewing suspects in criminal investigations. There were few
breaks in the interview. The pursuer stated that she felt “degraded” by the nature of the
interview and the circumstances in which it was undertaken. Her interviewers told her that
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the purpose was to obtain a background to the SOU and details of how the events involving
DSG had developed. She was not informed that her conduct formed part of the
investigation. She was not informed of the outcome of the investigation, save that DSG had
been reported to the Procurator Fiscal.
[18] On 27 April 2011 the pursuer attended her GP complaining of a stressful situation at
work. The relevant record recorded that in the assessment of the treating doctor she was
“coping well” and had “good insight at this stage.” She declined medication and certified
time off work was not deemed necessary at this time.6
[19] During this period the pursuer continued to be engaged solely in addressing matters
arising out of the result of the discoveries in the covert office in April. In June 2011 a
Detective Constable Scott McLeod was assigned to the SOU to assist her with the process.
By about the end of July the pursuer’s evidence was that she felt the problem was contained
and under control because no new discoveries were being made and those which had been
made were being properly and adequately addressed.
[20] On 27 July 2011 the pursuer was instructed by DI Rae to immediately attend at
Osprey House. She met with Detective Chief Inspector John Thomson (“DCI Thomson”)
and Detective Superintendent Laurie Morrison (“DSI Morrison”), both of PSU. She was
informed that Strathclyde Police as DSG’s parent force had demanded an investigation into
the SCDEA investigation. She was further told that Grampian had agreed with this. She
was then told that for transparency reasons she was being suspended from her role as an
undercover operative within SOU to allow the Strathclyde investigation to proceed. She
was told that the investigation would take about 6 weeks “give or take,” which she
6 PDF 704 and 823
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understood would be her period of suspension from SOU. She was not informed of the
remit of the investigation. She was not advised that the remit included investigating the
appropriateness of her conduct in the circumstances of the April discoveries. She was not
told where she was being transferred. During the course of this interview she was informed
by DCI Thomson that Grampian had requested she be returned during the period of
suspension but that SCDEA supported her retention within their authority. In relation to
the conduct of this interview and her reaction the pursuer stated that she was extremely
distressed. She was crying during the interview, that she felt sick and that she was having
difficulty breathing. She made representation to the interviewing officers that she could not
understand why this was happening, that she was the innocent party and the officer who
had discovered the problem being investigated. She further stated that her distress was a
reaction to being informed by police colleagues that she was part of a process in which
SCDEA were effectively using her as a scapegoat and that the outcome of the investigation
would be the termination of her career. She stated that her recollection was that the
interview lasted an hour. She was so distressed at the end that DCI Thomson requested
DSI Morrison to remove her from Osprey House to avoid other persons seeing her in that
state. DSI Morrison did so and took her to a café at Dobbie’s Garden Centre at Braehead.
She remained with DSI Morrison in the café for about one hour, she was distressed
throughout, using her words in evidence which went unchallenged, “sobbing my heart out”.
She stated that DSI Morrison was “dismissive” and told her “it’s only a job”. When
DSI Morrison left she said that she was completely distraught, felt abandoned, betrayed and
used. She left the café and called a Grampian police officer, Detective Inspector Thom
(“DI Thom”) whom she had worked with in the past and whom she regarded as a friend.
She described herself as being extremely distressed during the course of the conversation
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with DI Thom. I interject to note that DI Thom gave unchallenged evidence supporting,
insofar as he could on the basis of a telephone call, the pursuer’s characterisation of her state
during the call. The pursuer conveyed the gravamen of her interview earlier that day with
PSU. Her recollection was that DI Thom undertook to immediately speak to a senior officer
in Grampian. She was subsequently informed that an arrangement had been made for her
to speak with Chief Inspector Richard Craig (“Ch Insp Craig”) of Grampian during the
course of that evening. Following the telephone conversation with DI Thom the pursuer
called another police officer and made arrangements for that person to collect her and take
her home, which was complied with. She subsequently spoke to Ch Insp Craig on the
telephone that evening. She said she was upset and crying during the course of that
telephone conversation, again something which Ch Insp Craig supported in giving
evidence. On 29 July 2011 the pursuer drove to Aberdeen and met with Ch Insp Craig.
[21] On either 28 or 29 July 2011 the pursuer was informed that she would be temporarily
moved to the Witness Protection Department of SCDEA.7 She was upset at this posting, did
not want to go and wished to remain in the SOU. She spoke to DI Rae about this who
submitted a report requesting that she remain in SOU in a non-operational role. DI Rae’s
request was supported by Supt Thomas but rejected by Ch Supt Whitelock.
[22] The pursuer recalled attending at Osprey House to commence her role in witness
protection on 1 August 2011. DI Rae accompanied her to the offices of witness protection.
On arrival the officer in charge was unaware that the pursuer was to be moved to his
department. She spoke with DCI Thomson who, essentially, informed her that the officer
responsible for arranging her move had failed to do so and was on holiday. She was also
7 PDF 1223, the pursuer’s SCDEA personal record, records a start date in witness protection on 4
August 2011.
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informed that arrangements had been made for another Detective Sergeant to move into
SOU and assume the responsibilities formally discharged by herself. Given that she was
unable to commence work in witness protection at that time she left Osprey House. She
recalls feeling sick.
[23] On 2 August 2011 the pursuer again attended her general practitioner. The relevant
GP notes record the practitioner’s view that she was experiencing “ongoing extreme stress at
work”. 8 In a subsequent referral note to a psychiatrist the general practitioner recorded his
view that at this stage “she was clearly suffering from anxiety and depression”. 9 The GP
prescribed appropriate medication for depression and anxiety. The pursuer indicated that
she has been prescribed medication for anxiety and depression continuously since
August 2011.
[24] The pursuer commenced work in witness protection on the basis of her recollection
approximately one week after seeing the doctor on 2 August. The relevant personal record
indicates commencement in witness protection on 4 August 2011, albeit that may be her
formal date of assignment to that unit rather than the date when she commenced work. She
worked in that unit for a relatively short period of time before going on leave. During the
few days she worked in witness protection she was assisted by the detective sergeant who
replaced her in SOU for some assistance in relation to matters about the job which were
outwith that person’s knowledge. She willingly provided assistance as requested. She was
due to return from leave on 29 August 2011. On that date she attended her GP. On this
occasion the GP noted “ongoing stress at work”. 10 She also complained of exacerbation of a
8 PDF703
9 PDF823
10 PDF703
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pre-existing physical condition. She was certified as unfit for work. In evidence she
explained that due to the stigma she said existed in the police associated with being off work
due to stress she was anxious that the medical certificate reflected the exacerbation of her
pre-existing physical condition rather than anxiety and depression.
[25] The pursuer was at pains, both in examination-in-chief and cross-examination, to
stress that she was informed prior to her move to witness protection that the move was of a
temporary nature. Further, she stated she was never informed that the move was other than
temporary. She pointed out that her personal record supported this assertion.11 It should
also be stated that DI Rae gave evidence that he, at least initially, thought the move was
temporary.
[26] The pursuer returned to work on 3 October 2011. On 5 October she was told by the
officer who had replaced her in SOU that “no one wants to tell you this, but your job was
advertised”. The officer also informed her that she intended to apply for the pursuer’s
former job on a permanent basis. She said that she had informed the pursuer of this because
she did not wish to do anything behind her back. The pursuer’s position was that this was
the first occasion that she became aware that she would not and could not return to her
former role. She said that she was distraught on receiving this information. She spoke by
telephone with Ch Insp Craig of Grampian Police and arranged to meet him the following
day at the police college at Tulliallan. She said that the meeting went ahead and during the
course thereof the Chief Inspector told her that he thought there must have been a mistake
and that her role would not have been advertised without her being told of this. She also
said that she spoke at that time to DI Rae about this matter. He informed her that the officer
11 PDF1223
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in her role should not have spoken to her about the job advertisement. She took that
statement from DI Rae as confirmation that the job had been advertised and that DI Rae
knew of that fact. On 7 October 2011 the pursuer returned to Osprey House and spoke to
the head of HR at SCDEA. That person confirmed that the pursuer’s role in SOU of the
SCDEA had been advertised. She also said that the head of HR informed her that the
Deputy Director General of SCDEA, Johnny Gwynne had told her that Grampian had
decided that the pursuer was never to be an undercover police officer again or to work in
SOU. Again the pursuer’s evidence was that she was distraught about this information and
was finding it difficult to breathe. She recalls the meeting with the head of HR lasting about
an hour. At the end of the meeting the pursuer left the premises and work. She was in
distress. She has not worked since 7 October 2011.
[27] After leaving Osprey House on 7 October 2011 the pursuer had a further meeting
with the head of HR at the SCDEA, on this occasion in a café in Byres Road, Glasgow. The
head of HR told her again that her understanding was that Grampian Police had requested
that the pursuer did not return to SOU or operate as an undercover police officer. It was
further the evidence of the pursuer that she had been told by the head of HR that that person
had telephoned Ch Insp Craig of Grampian and had been informed that he was unaware of
any request made by Grampian to the effect that the pursuer should not return to work in
SOU.
[28] On 11 October 2011 she attended on Mrs Ross for a session of psychological support.
She continued to have regular sessions with Mrs Ross until March 2015. All this treatment
was paid for by SCDEA.
[29] On or around 14 September 2011 an Initial Assessment Report prepared by Detective
Inspector James Dunbar (“DI Dunbar”) on behalf of the Deputy Chief Constables of
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Strathclyde and Grampian Police had been made available to those authorities.12 The
purpose of the report had been, in part, to “establish what stewardship responsibilities have
been given to DSG and [the pursuer]” and to “Highlight possible misconduct by either
officer” and “Highlight possible work performance findings by either officer”. The report
contained five potential allegations of misconduct on the part of the pursuer and in addition
identified some potential work performance findings on her part. On 19 October 2011 the
Deputy Chief Constable of Grampian and Chief Superintendent Euan Stewart
(“Ch Supt Stewart”) of that force met and decided that on the basis of DI Dunbar’s report
the pursuer should be provided with management advice, that representing the lowest level
of available sanction available. As a consequence of that decision an arrangement was made
that Ch Supt Stewart should meet with the pursuer at a neutral venue in Aberdeen on
8 November 2011. The pursuer attended that meeting on that date accompanied by
Ch Insp Craig of Grampian. Ch Supt Stewart commenced giving management advice based
on the potential allegations of misconduct and failings in work performance contained
within DI Dunbar’s report. The first piece of management advice proceeded on the assertion
that the pursuer had known about the activities of DSG and had failed to inform her line
manager of these matters. At this stage the pursuer stated in evidence that she intervened
and informed the Chief Superintendent that that proposition was factually incorrect. There
was a discussion about the factual basis of the report following which Ch Supt Stewart
determined that it was inappropriate to proceed to give management advice and closed the
meeting.
12 PDF1833-1840
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[30] On 21 December 2011 the pursuer was contacted by telephone by the head of HR at
SCDEA. She said that the head of HR advised her to accept the management advice based
upon the report because to do otherwise would “open a can of worms”. The head of HR
said that she had been asked by “management” to tell her this. On the same day the pursuer
met with DCI Thomson of SCDEA at a Costa café in the Braehead shopping centre. The
pursuer said that at the meeting DCI Thomson advised her that she “needed to accept this
management advice and we need to draw a line under it”. He gave the pursuer a summary
of the conclusions of the report by DI Dunbar, including the five areas of potential
misconduct. He did not show the pursuer the report. The first time the pursuer had seen
the report was during the course of the present litigation. On being told of the five
allegations of potential misconduct by DCI Thomson at the meeting in the Costa café the
pursuer rejected them. She said that she told DCI Thomson that the report was totally
incorrect and that the conclusions, based on inaccuracy were professionally and personally
damaging to her. An account of the meeting with DCI Thomson on 21 December 2011 was
given by the pursuer to the psychologist Mrs Ross at a meeting on 17 January 2012.
[31] On 16 February 2012 the pursuer again met with Ch Supt Stewart. She was again
accompanied at that meeting by Ch Insp Craig and on this occasion by a representative from
the Scottish Police Federation. At this meeting Ch Supt Stewart delivered two pieces of
management advice to the pursuer. That advice was in the following terms:
“Given that you are in a supervisory rank you: should have acted sooner in voicing
your concerns; must be willing to challenge colleagues in relation to inappropriate
behaviour.”13
13 PDF1868
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[32] In 2013 the pursuer applied for ill health retirement. She stated that the reasons she
applied for retirement was that she continued to suffer from stress, anxiety, depression and
“not being able to bounce back to my former self”. She was granted ill health retirement in
March 2013.
Other evidence adduced by pursuer
[33] Police Inspector Nicholas Thom (“Insp Thom”) of Police Scotland had known the
pursuer since around 1991 when he commenced employment with Grampian Police. He
had sporadic contact with the pursuer during the 1990’s when they both served in
Aberdeen. His opinion at that time was that she was a very capable police officer. In 2008
he was a Detective Inspector in intelligence based in Aberdeen. In early 2011 he was the
district coordinator for Grampian in relation to test purchasing and in that capacity had
contact with the pursuer who was then the national coordinator for test purchasing. He was
asked about contact with the pursuer in July 2011. He recalled being contacted by her, by
telephone, one afternoon when he was at home. He did not remember the precise date. He
quickly appreciated that the pursuer was crying and distressed. He found it difficult to
understand what she was saying. He had never heard the pursuer in that state before. He
tried to establish what was concerning the pursuer, telling her repeatedly to calm down. He
eventually ascertained that she was calling from a car park in Glasgow having just left a
meeting with officers of PSU. He also ascertained that she had been a “whistle-blower” and
that she now felt that she was being accused of wrongdoing. He also thought that she
mentioned that she was being moved to witness protection on a temporary basis. The
phone call lasted approximately ten minutes. At the end of the call he was concerned as to
her welfare. He accordingly contacted Ch Insp Craig and made an arrangement for that
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person to telephone the pursuer that evening. He spoke to the pursuer again, later the same
evening after she had spoken with Ch Insp Craig.
[34] Richard Craig was a Chief Inspector in Grampian Police during the period in 2011-12
when he had involvement with the matters with which this case is concerned. At that time
he was deputy head of HR for Grampian Police based in Aberdeen. Prior to his involvement
in the events about which he gave evidence he was aware of the pursuer and of her
operational role but did not know her as an individual.
[35] His recollection was that in July 2011 he was contacted by a senior CID officer who
asked him to make contact with the pursuer in the exercise of his welfare function towards
police officers. The officer who contacted him gave him no knowledge of the background
reasons giving rise to the need for the pursuer to receive welfare assistance. He was given a
mobile telephone number where he could contact the pursuer. He telephoned the pursuer
and arranged to meet with her in Aberdeen at a neutral venue away from police offices. His
recollection of the pursuer’s presentation during the telephone call was that she was
“tearful, emotional, very anxious, seeking clarity into procedures and support that I could
offer her”. He was of the view that she was “deeply upset”.
[36] The arranged meeting in Aberdeen took place. His recollection and understanding
of the meeting was that the pursuer informed him that she was being moved from her
current role in SOU to another part of SCDEA. She told him that the move was of a
temporary nature. She indicated that she had received no welfare support from anyone
within SCDEA. He indicated further that following this meeting he had a further two or
three telephone calls with the pursuer. During these calls the issue of the pursuer’s move
within SCDEA was discussed and whether that move was to be temporary or permanent.
There was also discussion about the rationale behind the move. Ch Insp Craig was able to
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explain to the pursuer as deputy head of HR in Grampian that the pursuer was seconded by
Grampian to SCDEA and any move within that authority was outwith the competence of
Grampian. He told her with what he characterised as the “utmost certainty” that Grampian
Police could make no offer of a move in employed role within SCDEA. He further explained
that Grampian had no input or control over any change in the pursuer’s role whilst
seconded to SCDEA. As a result of the meeting and telephone conversations,
Superintendent Craig telephoned the head of HR at SCDEA. He explained that he was the
Grampian Police point of welfare contact for the pursuer. His recollection was that this
conversation, and therefore SCDEA’s knowledge of his involvement and role dated from
late July 2011. The purpose of the call was to attempt to ascertain whether the move of the
pursuer from SOU to witness protection was permanent or temporary. He was clear that he
was not asked during the course of conversation whether Grampian Police had any view on
the proposed move to witness protection.
[37] Ch Insp Craig had no recollection of meeting the pursuer at the police college at
Tulliallan at or about this time. He did not deny that such a meeting may have taken place,
his position was simply lack of memory of any meeting.
[38] Ch Insp Craig stated that he and Ch Supt Stewart of Grampian Police met with the
pursuer in Aberdeen during November 2011. The purpose of the meeting was to enable the
Chief Superintendent to give management advice to the pursuer arising from an
independent investigation carried out on behalf of Strathclyde and Grampian Police. His
recollection was that when the Chief Superintendent began the meeting and sought to
deliver the first piece of management advice based on the report the pursuer made it clear
that she did not agree with the factual basis upon which the advice was premised. This
matter was discussed between the pursuer and the Chief Superintendent. On consideration
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of the pursuer’s position and explanation the Chief Superintendent agreed to stop the
meeting in order to allow him to make further enquiries in relation to the factual basis upon
which the report proceeded. He took no part in any enquiries undertaken by
Ch Supt Stewart following this meeting. He was asked to attend a further meeting with the
pursuer and Ch Supt Stewart on 16 February 2012. By that time Ch Supt Stewart had
obtained further factual information and on the basis thereof gave two pieces of
management advice to the pursuer at the meeting. Ch Insp Craig stated that the pursuer
accepted the advice but in response stated her position was that she could have done
nothing else in the circumstances she discovered in July 2011.
[39] DSM is a Detective Sergeant employed in undercover police operations. As a result
of his role the court granted him anonymity. His home force is Northumbria Police. He
responded to an advert placed in an edition of the “Police Review” dated 29 July 2011 by
SCDEA for “Specialists required to tackle serious organised crime in Scotland”. After he
had submitted his application and before a subsequent interview in connection with his
application for the post, which took place in either October or November 2011, he visited
SOU at SCDEA in Paisley. During the course of his interview he was informed that the
pursuer was the previous holder of the job he had applied for and that she had been
seconded elsewhere in SCDEA. He was the successful candidate and commenced his role in
March 2011.
[40] Fiona Riddoch was a former police officer, having retired in the rank of Detective
Inspector in 2015. Her home force was Strathclyde Police. In 2011 she was serving as a
Detective Sergeant in the confidential unit of SCDEA. At that time she knew the pursuer
and was aware that she was employed in SOU at SCDEA. DS Riddoch’s recollection was
that at that time she had worked with the pursuer on about two or three occasions. She had
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no issues with the pursuer but equally was not socially friendly. She regarded her as no
more than a work colleague. In about July 2011 she was asked if she would undertake a
temporary secondment in SOU. She agreed. She was aware that the temporary role she was
undertaking was normally carried out by the pursuer. Her evidence was that she was aware
that there was “something going on” within SCDEA but did not know what that was. When
she began work in SOU she did not know if the pursuer was working elsewhere or was
offsite for some reason. After she commenced work in SOU she had some contact with the
pursuer. She talked to the pursuer about the duties she was expected to undertake and
asked her about day to day running of the office. She remembers that she received a request
from a procurator fiscal about a matter and consulted with the pursuer about how to deal
with this. Essentially she recalled her contact at this time with the pursuer as involving
matters of “general housekeeping” within SOU for which she was now responsible. She
stated that the pursuer was “very generous with her knowledge and assistance” when asked
questions about these matters. Her temporary secondment to SOU terminated on
13 October 2011 for matters which are unrelated to the issues in the present case.
[41] DS Riddoch was clear that during her period in SOU she was performing the tasks
which the pursuer had previously undertaken. Her view was that SOU continued to
organise covert operations at this time. She purchased new assets for use in covert
operations for SOU at this time. She was aware that a permanent position of the sort she
was filling temporarily had been advertised within SCDEA. She was qualified to apply for
that role. Her understanding, which may have been obtained from DI Rae, was that the job
advertised was the role formerly filled by the pursuer. She in fact spoke to the pursuer
about the advertisement. The pursuer confirmed that the job advertised was the role she
had filled until late July 2011. One reason why she had spoken to the pursuer about this
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matter was because she felt it would have been dishonest to apply for the role without
discussing it with the pursuer. After she had spoken to the pursuer she applied for the job
but was not supported in that application by her line manager. Her application did not
proceed.
[42] Daniel Rae is a former police officer, having retired in the rank of Detective Inspector
in 2013. In 2010/11 he was working at SCDEA. In about September 2010 he assumed day to
day responsibility for SOU. In that capacity he was the direct superior and line manager of
both the pursuer and DSG. In turn his superior and manager was Chief Inspector James
Reid who in turn reported to Superintendent Ian Thomas. Supt Thomas’ superior was Chief
Superintendent Whitelock.
[43] On taking over responsibility for operations in SOU DI Rae instituted a review of
work in that department. He ultimately submitted a paper which formed the basis of
changes in the operation of the unit. One change was an exchange of roles between the
pursuer and DSG. Part of this change involved the pursuer becoming responsible for
financial arrangements and accounting for covert assets. DI Rae became aware that despite
the formal change in roles he had instructed there had been a lack of progress in actual
transference of duties. He considered that this was primarily caused by obstructions created
by DSG. When pressed he was clear that the majority of the difficulty in transference of
accounting roles to the pursuer was created by the attitude to the move of DSG. In essence
DSG was reluctant to exchange roles with the pursuer.
[44] DI Rae also stated that on his assuming responsibility for SOU he became aware of
the pursuer’s living arrangements, in particular that she spent substantial periods of time
residing in covert flats operated by SCDEA in the Glasgow area. He considered that was
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unfair to her and was responsible for instituting a process which culminated in her changing
her residential arrangements in Glasgow.
[45] In relation to the events of April 2011 his recollection was that his first involvement
was when the pursuer telephoned him informing him of that she had discovered
unaccounted for material in covert office premises operated by SCDEA. He attended at the
premises with the pursuer on the day she initially telephoned him. He discovered bags that
were full of mail which had not been opened in what he described as “years”. He found
details of covert identities which were unknown to him. He discovered cash, apparently
unaccounted for, “stuffed in a drawer”. His general description of what he discovered was
that it constituted a “total disaster”. He telephoned his immediate superior Ch Insp Reid
and informed him that he required to see him immediately. He could not remember the
exact date this occurred but considered it was either 6 or 7 April 2011. He met with
Ch Insp Reid and Supt Thomas. All three were concerned about the potential for
compromise to SCDEA’s covert operations. They were concerned about the presence of
accounted for cash in the office. They were concerned about the existence of covert
identities which were unknown to senior management. They were concerned about the
potential for disclosure of the true identities of persons operating under pseudonyms.
Beyond that there were concerns in relation to letters found emanating from debt recovery
agencies, apparently unpaid bills and the possibility of cash purchases which were not
accounted for.
[46] DI Rae was aware that at the date of discovery, DSG was absent on holiday. His
recollection was that the process of discovering the extent of the problem that had been
uncovered started during the period when DSG was absent on holiday. He considered that
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SCDEA became aware of the full extent of the problem on DSG’s return from holiday having
returned and cooperating with the authority.
[47] His evidence was that on Ch Insp Reid and Supt Thomas visiting the premises and
becoming aware of the nature and extent of the problem he and the pursuer were tasked to
work at the covert premises full-time in order to get to the bottom of the problem. He stated
that they were both advised by senior managers that all operational activity was to be
suspended at that time. The work they undertook in the following weeks was to close down
assets, reconcile and close bank accounts, sell vehicles and dispose of or terminate lets of
covert premises. His estimate was that the total clean-up operation took something in the
order of six to eight months to complete. DI Rae became aware that PSU were involved.
Operatives from PSU attended at the covert premises and took possession of all documents
discovered by DI Rae and the pursuer. He liaised with PSU and received instructions from
them. His understanding and belief was that the pursuer also liaised and cooperated with
PSU. He was aware that the pursuer was interviewed by personnel from PSU at
Kirkintilloch Police office in April 2011. He was also interviewed by persons from that unit.
His interview extended over a period of about one day.
[48] In relation to the operation of SOU between April and October 2011 his evidence was
that DS Riddoch came to work in the unit because they “needed numbers”. He remembered
being spoken to by the pursuer and informed that it was proposed to transfer her to witness
protection. He discussed that issue with her and agreed to put in a report to his superiors
asking if she could remain in SOU in a non-operational role to “assist me re-build the unit”.
That request was refused. He stated that his understanding at first was that the pursuer’s
move to witness protection was “sort of temporary”, he did not remember who told him of
the move but did recall being told, probably by Supt Thomas, that the decision to move the
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pursuer had been made by Supt Whitelock. He was shown the pursuer’s employment
record 14, but had never seen this before. He confirmed that the document stated that the
move of the pursuer to witness protection was a “Temporary Posting”.15 He did not know
the reasons behind the temporary move. He confirmed that when the pursuer told him
about the move she appeared to be “quite upset”. He dated his knowledge of the pursuer’s
move to witness protection as being about the end of July 2011.
[49] In 2010/11 Detective Inspector James Dunbar was an investigator for PSU. His role
included investigations into alleged misconduct. During the course of 2011 he was tasked
with reviewing operations within SOU of SCDEA. He confirmed that he conducted an
inquiry and thereafter produced a report entitled “Special Operations Initial Assessment
Enquiry”.16 The report was undated but the witness thought that it was completed and
circularised “about 14 September 2011”. He described the circumstances in which he
prepared the report as being that he was “basically given paperwork” and conducted a
desktop review of that material. He himself conducted no interviews of any person
involved with the matters under report. The conclusions of the report were stated on the
final page 17 and were his, based upon the documentation provided to him.
[50] DI Dunbar was asked if he recalled meeting with Ch Supt Stewart of Grampian
Police in December 2011. He recalled a meeting with a senior police officer from that force
at that time, albeit he could not remember the officer’s name. His memory was that he was
instructed to attend the meeting which took place at Pitt Street, Glasgow. He was shown
14 PDF1222
15 PDF1223
16 PDF1833-1840
17 PDF1840, p8 of the internal numbering of the document.
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Ch Supt Stewart’s file note of the meeting.18 Whilst he could not remember the “specifics of
the meeting” he agreed with a proposition put by the court that the contents of the file note
were not inconsistent with the evidence he had previously given.
[51] Steven Whitelock was a former police officer having retired holding the rank of
Assistant Chief Constable and Deputy Director General of SCDEA. He joined SCDEA in
2008 initially as interim Director General and from March 2009 Deputy Director General of
that agency.
[52] Ch Supt Whitelock stated that he became aware of a problem within SCDEA on or
about 6 April 2011. The initial information conveyed to him was that documents and
materials had been found in offsite premises which gave rise to concerns of mismanagement
and misconduct. His initial information was that the problem concerned documentation
and invoices. The initial report came to him from Supt Thomas. His position was that he
was never aware of the full circumstances that gave rise to this problem and that he did not
recall details of the matter. He did however consider the matter serious having regard to the
nature of the job undertaken by SCDEA and he was concerned that it might give rise to
issues relating to compromise of operatives or officers within the unit.
[53] He was aware of a PSU investigation into this matter, his understanding being that
that was conducted by Detective Inspector Allister Thompson (“DI Thompson”).
[54] Ch Supt Whitelock was unable to give details of the work conducted in SOU after
discovery of the problem in April 2011. Ch Insp Reid and DI Rae conducted that work,
which he characterised as “general housekeeping” to repair damage occasioned. He was
aware that assets were closed down and premises were disposed of and, further, that there
18 PDF1868
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28
were certain purchase of new assets for use in SOU. He did not dispute a suggestion, based
on the evidence of DI Rae, that it took about 6 months to rectify problems occasioned by the
issues discovered in April 2011. He was unable to say if any undercover operations were
undertaken by SOU in the period of 6 months following April 2011. He did however say
that he would “be surprised if any” took place. He did not think that the two sergeants
working in SOU would be supporting any outside operations in the period of 6 months
following the discovery. His overall view was that in the 6 months following the discovery
the unit was not functioning as it should have done. He considered that because of the
mismanagement discovered the unit was compromised. He accepted that the unit was not
formally closed down but that it did not in that period provide the support that was
expected of it. He stated that “other people” were brought into the unit but that there was a
hiatus in operations for about 6 months. He confirmed that DS Riddoch and DSM were
brought into the unit in that period.
[55] When questioned in relation to the position of the pursuer he agreed with a
proposition that DI Rae was told by Supt Thomas that the pursuer was not to return to
special operations. He agreed with the proposition that that decision was made by senior
managers in SCDEA. He freely accepted that he made the decision that the pursuer should
no longer be employed in SOU. When asked the reasons for that decision he stated: “I no
longer had confidence in her professional judgement”. He elaborated by saying that at the
time he reached that decision he was still establishing the damage done in the unit and,
further, was looking for “freshness in the unit”. When asked what caused him to have lost
confidence in the pursuer he stated that working in the unit required a high degree of
integrity from a police officer. In the case of the pursuer there were a number of events
which had reached him to conclude that he could no longer have confidence in her. First, he
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said that he had discovered that the pursuer had, albeit prior to April 2011, been residing on
a residential basis in covert premises operated by SCDEA. He characterised this as a poor
management decision and lack of judgement by her. He stated that when he found out
about this situation he had taken steps to correct it. He said that in late 2010/early 2011
SCDEA provided financial assistance to assist the pursuer’s relocation. Second, he cited the
break in which had occurred in covert premises occupied by the pursuer and the reported
loss of £5,000 worth of jewellery belonging to her. He considered that this event had the
potential to compromise the operations of the unit. He had required to order an
investigation of the break in by regular police. The subsequent discovery by the pursuer of
her jewellery in her premises in Aberdeen rendered that investigation redundant. He did
not consider that the incident reflected well on the pursuer. His third concern related to the
mismanagement of covert finances. Whilst he was aware that principal responsibility for
that lay with DSG, his view was that the pursuer “must have been aware” of this matter. He
based that view on the fact that the two officers worked together within a small office, had
worked together for many years, that each had to understand the nature of the other’s work
and, beyond that, it should have been obvious to the pursuer that there were issues about
DSG’s management. Overall he was “surprised that she had not seen anything”. When he
put together these three factors his judgement was that she was no longer suitable to work
in the role that she was filling.
[56] Ch Supt Whitelock accepted that he had never spoken to the pursuer about any of
these matters either individually or cumulatively.
[57] When asked when his decision that the pursuer was not to be employed in SOU had
been taken he stated: “It would be in April 2011. When the investigation into the discovery
commenced. I decided that I was not going to allow either officer back into the unit.” When
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30
it was suggested to him that the pursuer only found out that she was not to return to SOU
on 5 October 2011 Ch Supt Whitelock said that he could not comment on that. When asked
about the pursuer’s move out of SOU on 27 July 2011 and whether she was told that that
was a temporary or permanent move Ch Supt Whitelock agreed that he was aware that she
was relocated to witness protection at that time. He was not aware that she was told it was a
temporary move. His position was that that was an HR matter and that he did not know
about it. He said he was unaware that DI Rae had submitted a paper requesting that the
pursuer be retained in special operations on a non-operational basis. He simply reiterated
that by that time he had made his decision that she was not to return to special operations.
His view was that normally moves within SCDEA would be on a temporary basis pending
the outcome of a decision in relation to role. He accepted that the pursuer’s personnel
record seemed to show that the relocation to witness protection was a “Temporary
Posting”.19 He was not surprised at that. He thought the move would be described as
temporary until the investigation was completed.
[58] Euan Stewart is a former police officer having retired with the rank of Chief
Superintendent in 2013. Between 2009-12 he was a Chief Superintendent and head of
professional standards in Grampian Police. During the course of his police career he had
extensive experience of misconduct proceedings within Grampian Police. His evidence in
this regard was that in misconduct, or potential misconduct, situations a decision maker had
to consider all issues, consider organisational values, the law and to act proportionally.
[59] In relation to the events of 2011 with which this action is concerned Ch Supt Stewart
indicated that he knew the pursuer prior to July 2011. He could not remember ever working
19 PDF1223
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31
with her and he had never been her line manager. He did however see her during the 1990’s
in Aberdeen. He was also aware that in 2011, and indeed for some time prior thereto, she
had been seconded to SCDEA. In July 2011 he was telephoned by Deputy Chief Constable
McNab of Grampian Police and told that there was a sensitive issue which the Deputy Chief
Constable wished him to deal with. The extent of the information given to him was that
there was “something wrong with SCDEA”, he was not to discuss any sensitivities around
the issue causing the problem, he thinks he was told that the pursuer was involved in the
problem and he was to investigate the matter. He produced extracts from his handwritten
day book which contained entries in relation to his involvement in the matter.20 He gave
evidence about two video conferences he held involving himself, Deputy Chief
Constable Richardson of Strathclyde Police, Johnny Gwynne of SCDEA, DI Thompson of
SCDEA and Superintendent Macintyre of Strathclyde Police. The outcome of these meetings
was that the report conducted by DI Dunbar was instigated and the report of the Detective
Inspector received. Following receipt of this report he confirmed that he arranged a meeting
with the pursuer to take place on 8 November 2011 at which it was intended to give her
management advice based upon DI Dunbar’s report. Ch Supt Richard Craig also attended
that meeting. His evidence of the meeting was that he started to give advice but
immediately the pursuer sought to rebut the factual basis of the material he was basing the
advice upon. On this happening the witness stated “my brain said something was not
right”. He decided that he should not give the advice and terminated the interview. He
considered that before he could give advice in circumstances where the factual basis upon
which he was proceeding was being challenged he required to find out more about what
20 PDF1849/1866
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had happened. He determined that he would do so. He considered that it was necessary for
him to take this step as a matter of fairness. This was based upon his experience and
practice within Grampian Police. He said that he had been particularly concerned when he
heard that the only source of evidence used by DI Dunbar emanating from the pursuer was
an interview which had spanned three days. He had serious concerns, again based on his
experience, as to the fairness of an interview of that nature.
[60] After the meeting Ch Supt Stewart arranged to meet with the author of the report,
DI Dunbar, at Pitt Street in Glasgow. That meeting took place on 12 December 2011.
Ch Supt Stewart’s file note of that meeting was produced. It showed that the meeting
consisted of Ch Supt Stewart, Superintendent Macintyre and DI Dunbar. It records that the
potential allegations contained in DI Dunbar’s report were based upon the Inspector’s
reading of statements held by SCDEA and speaking with members of staff at that unit. It
records that DI Dunbar stated at the meeting that “much more enquiry would be necessary”
before the points highlighted in respect of [the pursuer] could be used in relation to “giving
her advice”. Ch Supt Stewart’s conclusion, as stated in evidence, was that “something was
really not right around the process applied” in preparation of the report. He was concerned,
again based on his experience, that the conclusions reached were wrong. His view was that
something required to be done to redress the situation. He formed the view that the advice
given to the pursuer should be along the lines of “given that you are in a supervisory rank
you should have acted sooner in voicing your concerns, must be willing to challenge
colleagues in relation to inappropriate behaviour”.
[61] Thereafter he arranged a further meeting to be attended by the pursuer and Ch Insp
Craig on 16 February 2012. At that meeting he gave the advice he stated as appropriate in
his meeting in Glasgow on 12 December 2011. The advice was accepted by the pursuer.
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[62] Mary Keenan Ross (Mrs Ross) is a clinical psychologist with 34 years experience in
practice. For many years she has been retained by the police to provide psychological
services to undercover police officers. She was initially retained in this capacity by
Strathclyde Police but since 1996 has provided services of this nature to police officers
engaged in undercover work with SCDEA. She explained the scope and function of her
work with undercover police officers as trying to ensure that they are supported and can
recognise and cope with stresses associated with working in an undercover role. The
objective is to ensure that they receive appropriate counselling before a psychological issue
arises. Undercover police officers should be seen every six months by Mrs Ross. There is
scope within her agreement with the police force to provide more frequent counselling if
that is required by an officer. Undercover police officers can also request to see Mrs Ross.
[63] In the foregoing capacity Mrs Ross has seen the pursuer over an extended period of
time. She first saw her in 1998 when the pursuer was suffering depressive symptoms
following the death of a parent. She again saw the pursuer in 2003 and for a period
thereafter in relation to a recurrence of depressive symptoms following a serious illness. In
her capacity as clinical psychologist providing services for SCDEA she began to see the
pursuer again in 2007. She was consulted by the pursuer at the time of the events with
which this action is concerned in 2011. She continued to treat the pursuer thereafter and last
saw her in about February 2013. At the request of the police Mrs Ross prepared a
psychological report in relation to the pursuer dated 24 August 2012.21 She spoke to the
terms of this report in her evidence. In addition there were produced Mrs Ross’s manuscript
21 PDF812
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notes of meetings with the pursuer between the period 25 March 2005 – 11 October 2011.22
She spoke to the contents of these notes when giving evidence.
[64] At a consultation on 11 October 2011 the pursuer provided Mrs Ross with her
version of the events in her work since April of that year.23 She told Mrs Ross that following
her discovery and reporting of the management problems in SOU in April she felt
“compromised”. She had had to work exceptionally long hours clearing up the
consequences of the mismanagement. She had initially thought that her work and life
would return to “normal” when the investigation and clear up was completed. What in fact
occurred was that she was removed from SOU and sent to another branch of SCDEA on
what she was told was a temporary basis. She was given no explanation for this move.
When she arrived at the temporary posting no one expected her and there was no work for
her to do. She felt abandoned. She subsequently discovered that her job had been
advertised and that she would not return to it. Again none of this was communicated to her
in a formal sense. In giving her evidence about the state of the pursuer at this time Mrs Ross
said: “She was broken – suffering considerable anxiety and depression. She was
traumatised by her treatment by the police. She was not able to cope.”
[65] It was Mrs Ross’s assessment that the events between April 2011 and her removal
from SOU in late July 2011 were psychologically damaging to the pursuer. Mrs Ross was
however of the opinion that the most significant damage occurred because of the pursuer’s
inability to ever return to SOU. She considered that “not returning to Special Operations
was a major stress. It was the loss of a role and the leaving of the role and the perception of
22 PDF351 - 364
23 PDF816 - 817
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what that meant” which caused the pursuer the most prolonged psychological damage. She
considered the problem to be compounded by the lack of clear communication from the
pursuer’s employers to her. Senior counsel for the pursuer asked Mrs Ross for her view on
what the situation would have been if the pursuer had been able to return to SOU after a
temporary move. Mrs Ross’s opinion was that she would have expected a “full recovery, to
her previous psychological level of functioning, prior to the discovery of what [DSG] had
done”. Mrs Ross’s opinion was that a return to SOU would have amounted to permanent
closure for the pursuer and also sent a message to her work colleagues that she had not been
implicated in the mismanagement at SOU. She considered that management’s treatment of
the pursuer kept open the issues in relation to this mismanagement and thereby occasioned
psychological damage to the pursuer.
Pursuer’s submissions
Liability of the defender
[66] The defender is the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland. The acts and
omissions the pursuer relied upon were breaches of duty by constables from legacy forces,
namely Strathclyde and Grampian, to the Police Service of Scotland. The Police Service of
Scotland came into force on 1 April 2013 as a result of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland)
Act 2012 (“the 2012 Act”). Prior to the coming into force of the 2012 Act the vicarious
liability of Chief Constables was governed by section 39 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967
which provided, inter alia;
“39. - Liability for wrongful acts of constables
(1) The chief constable of a police force shall be liable [for any unlawful conduct]
on the part of any constable [or police custody and security officer] under his
general direction in the performance or purported performance of his
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36
functions in like manner as a master is so liable [for any unlawful conduct] on
the part of his servant in the course of the servant’s employment.”
Schedule 5 of the 2012 Act deals with the transfer of, inter alios, liabilities from legacy forces
to the Police Service of Scotland. Paragraph 20 of schedule 5 provides:
“Transfer of liabilities of chief constables etc
20. By virtue of this paragraph, any liabilities of a chief constable of a police force
under section 39 of the 1967 Act and of the Director General of the SCDEA
under section 22 of the 2006 Act are, on and after the appointed day, to be
treated as liabilities of the chief constable of the Police Service under section
24 of this Act.”
Section 24 of the 2012 Act provides, inter alios:
“24. - Liability for unlawful conduct
(1) The chief constable is liable in respect of any unlawful conduct on the part of
any person falling within subsection (2) in the carrying out (or purported
carrying out) of that person’s functions in the same manner as an employer is
liable in respect of any unlawful conduct on the part of an employee in the
course of employment.”
[67] The submission was that had the present proceedings been raised prior to the
effective date on 1 April 2013 in terms of section 39 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 the
appropriate defenders would have been the chief constables of the relevant legacy forces.
Since the action was raised after the relevant date the effect of the 2012 Act is that the
defender sued in the present action is vicariously liable for the unlawful acts of constables in
the legacy forces. In the present case each relevant officer was seconded to SCDEA from a
legacy force and, accordingly, the correct defender is sued.
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37
Duty of care
[68] A number of duties are pled against the defender in article 6 of the Closed Record at
page 18. The pursuer did not found upon all duties pled but confined her case to duties
pled at pages 18 B-C and 18 D-E, as narrated in paragraph [1] of this opinion.
[69] It was observed by counsel that whilst persons, such as the pursuer, holding the
office of constable are not strictly employees it is well recognised that the general duty of an
employer to take reasonable care for the safety of its employees applies to police officers and
to the defender. It was submitted there was no reason in principle or policy for an
alternative view.24
[70] More generally it was submitted that the duty to take reasonable care for employees
includes taking reasonable steps to prevent psychiatric injury. The duty only arises if
psychiatric injury is foreseeable, unless physical injury is also foreseeable. It was not
contended that there was a foreseeable risk of physical injury in the present case. This was
developed by submitting there was a duty to take reasonable steps to avoid psychiatric
injury which encompassed a duty of fair treatment. It followed that if unfair treatment
would foreseeably cause psychiatric injury then there would be a duty to treat fairly
providing that fair treatment is a reasonable step.
[71] The foregoing submissions were founded upon and supported by three English
cases: Gogay v Herefordshire County Council;25Croft v Broadstairs & St Peter’s Town
Council;26Yapp v Foreign & Commonwealth Office.27
24 W v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 WLR 1607 per Lord Slynn of Hadley 1610 c-g.
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38
[72] In Gogay (supra) the issue was whether the defendant local authority had acted
reasonably in suspending the claimant from a post in a residential home while she
investigated circumstances surrounding a child living in the home. The investigation
concluded that there was no case to answer but that the claimant had suffered psychiatric
illness and loss of earnings as a result of suspension from employment. The claim was
based on a breach of an implied term of the claimant’s contract to the effect that the
defendants would not without reasonable cause conduct themselves in the manner likely to
destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between themselves
and the claimant. It was submitted that a duty of the nature desiderated in that case was
frequently referred to as a Malik duty being derived from a case of that name.28 It was said
for the purposes of stress at work claims there was no practical difference for an employer
between the content of the Malik duty and a common law duty to take reasonable care for
the safety of employees.29 In Gogay (supra) Hale LJ (as she then was) held that there had
been a breach of the Malik duty in circumstances where the claimant had been accused of
sexual abuse of a child and suspended without sufficient investigation. Her stated view was
that the claimant was entitled to “something better than the knee jerk reaction which
occurred in this case”.30
[73] Croft (supra) involved an employee’s claim for damages for psychiatric injury caused
by negligence or breach of contract by her employers, a town council. The claimant had
received a warning letter whilst off sick from work. The defenders made no attempt to
obtain the claimant’s version of events before administering a form of disciplinary warning
28 Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International [1998] AC 20
30 At paragraphs 55 – 59.
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39
and had not previously intimated any complaint received to the claimant. The absence of an
opportunity to respond to the complaint was described at first instance as “failing to observe
what I regard in this court as a basic rule of justice and fairness”.31 The claimant was
successful at first instance, albeit that in a successful appeal it was held that the psychiatric
harm was not reasonably foreseeable. The judge at first instance’s classification of the
treatment of the claimant and of the existence of an obligation to treat her fairly was not
however demurred from by the Court of Appeal.
[74] Yapp (supra) was a further case where at first instance it was held there had been a
breach of the obligation to give fair treatment to an employee. The case was submitted to
have some factual similarities to the present case. At first instance the ratio of the opinion of
Cranston J32 was as follows:
“In my view these submissions fall down because they overlook the claimant’s right
to fair treatment. That was an expressed term of his contract, although the duty of
fair treatment can also be derived from the implied term of trust and confidence in
the employer – employee relationship… Fair treatment in this case obliged the FCO
to conduct some preliminary investigation of the allegations which Mr Courtney had
levelled against the claimant before taking the decision to withdraw. In addition, fair
treatment obliged the FCO to inform the claimant of the allegations and to take into
account his critique of them.”
It was submitted that the implied term referred to by Cranston J is the Malik duty and
therefore comparable with the common law duty to take reasonable care for an employee’s
safety.
[75] My attention was drawn to a further passage in the opinion of Cranston J dealing
with the learned judge’s view of allegations made against the plaintiff at the same meeting
in which he was withdrawn from his post. In relation to that position Cranston J stated:
31 At paragraph 25
32 At paragraph 117
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40
“But whatever the claimant was told on 13 June was to no avail in meeting the
obligation of fair treatment since, crucially in my judgment, the decision to withdraw
had already been made… In no way could the 13 June interview with the claimant
meet the FCO’s contractual obligation of fair treatment. Fair treatment in the way I
have described was a mandatory requirement before the decision was made.”
[76] Yapp (supra) was another case where the decision at first instance was overturned on
appeal. Again, as with the case of Croft (supra) the Court of Appeal took no issue with the
existence of a duty of fair treatment at common law.
[77] The last point the pursuer’s counsel made in relation to Yapp (supra) was that the
Court of Appeal concluded that a case could usually be equally framed by reference to an
employer’s duty of care and that there was no practical difference between the two.33
[78] The pursuer’s submission was that on the basis the three cases of Gogay, Croft and
Yapp it was clear that there was a common law duty of fair treatment in circumstances such
as those arising in the present, providing psychiatric harm is reasonable foreseeable and that
the duty equates to the Malik implied contractual term.
[79] In relation to the content of the duty of fair treatment in the context of the present
case reference was made to Barber v Somerset County Council.34 In that case Lord Walker of
Gestingthorpe stated35;
“Every case will depend on its own facts on the well known statement of Swanwick J
in Stokes v Guest Keen and Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Limited remains the best
statement of general principle: ‘…the overall test is still the conduct of the
reasonable and prudent employer, taking positive thought for the safety of his
workers in the light of what he knows or ought to know… He must weigh up the
risk in terms of likelihood of injury occurring and the potential consequences if it
does; and he must balance against this the probable effectiveness of the precautions
that can be taken to meet it and the expense and inconvenience they involve. If he is
33 Yapp (supra) at paragraph 12
35 At paragraph 65
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41
found to have fallen below the standard properly expected of a reasonable and
prudent employer in this respect, he is negligent.”
In the context of that decision it was submitted that the content of the duty of fair treatment
will include such factors as the importance of the decision and the consequences of it. It was
submitted that in circumstances where a decision has an adverse effect on an individual a
reasonable and prudent employer who had a concern for the employee’s welfare would
have in mind issues of proportionality, fairness, organisational values and transparency. In
the context of that decision it was submitted that the content of the duty of fair treatment
will include such factors as the importance of the decision and the consequences of it. It was
submitted that in circumstances where a decision has an adverse effect on an individual a
reasonable and prudent employer who had a concern for the employee’s welfare would
have in mind issues of proportionality, fairness, organisational values and transparency. In
each of Yapp (supra), Gogay (supra) and Croft (supra) the duty required that an allegation or
complaint made against the employee be put to that person before any action was taken.
That was framed as a basic premise of fairness and, further, to allow a person subject to an
adverse decision to be given the opportunity to answer allegations. It was submitted that it
was particularly important in a case such as the present where the decision to move the
pursuer was a loss of confidence in her, raised significant issues regarding her integrity,
involved her ability to undertake her role and, finally, potentially questioned her
professional and personal reputation. These observations were said to be particularly
pointed having regard to the consideration that in explaining his loss of confidence in the
pursuer and his reasons for deciding to move her Ch Supt Whitelock expressed suspicion of
potential criminal conduct on the part of the pursuer. It also followed from this that the
duty of fair treatment required the allegation to be put to the pursuer in order that she was
Page 42 ⇓
42
afforded the opportunity to respond and potentially rebut the same. The duty was
submitted to extend to a requirement to carry out a sufficient level of investigation before
taking a serious and adverse decision in relation to the pursuer. It was not open to
Ch Supt Whitelock to make what was characterised as a “knee jerk” reaction in the absence
of proper and sufficient investigation.
[80] Finally on this chapter the submission was that the duties could all be said to arise as
a matter of common sense. They are reasonable steps that can easily be taken by the
reasonable and prudent employer. There was however in the factual matrix of the present
case a cross check to be found in the evidence of Ch Supt Stewart and his description of the
approach taken by PSU at Grampian. That force proceeded on the basis, according to
Ch Supt Stewart’s evidence, of recognition of a need for a decision maker to consider all
issues, think about organisational values, any applicable law and to understand what the
officer who was the subject of the complaints position was and to take a proportionate
approach.
Breach of duty of fair treatment
[81] On Ch Supt Whitelock’s own evidence the decision to remove the pursuer from her
post in SOU was taken in mid-April 2011. Ch Supt Whitelock’s approach was characterised
by counsel as “remarkable” and on no view according with the duty of fair treatment owed
to the pursuer. Again on Ch Supt Whitelock’s own evidence the basis of his decision was a
loss of confidence as a result of three events, the use of a covert flat, the allegedly illegitimate
claim regarding jewellery and the events following the discoveries of 6 April. As at the date
of Ch Supt Whitelock’s decision there had been no investigation in relation to the covert flat
or the jewellery. No investigations were in fact ever conducted into those matters. So far as
Page 43 ⇓
43
the events of 6 April were concerned at the time of Ch Supt Whitelock’s decision no
investigation had taken place. He was in fact on his own evidence unaware of the full
information which had been discovered as at the date of his decision. Furthermore at no
time were any of these concerns put either by Ch Supt Whitelock or by any other officer to
the pursuer for her response.
[82] The effect of Ch Supt Whitelock’s approach was that a serious and adverse decision
effecting the pursuer was taken in circumstances where there was no objective evidence
available in order to evaluate any concerns held by any person against her. There was no
proper procedure prior to a decision being reached by Ch Supt Whitelock. Senior counsel
for the pursuer went so far to describe the situation as a good example of why a duty of fair
treatment exists and should exist.
[83] In the submission of the pursuer this failure was compounded by subsequent events
where she was given no support by SCDEA in the period after April 2011. She was
misinformed as to the reason and nature of her transfer from SOU in July 2011. She was at
no time given any opportunity to respond to any criticisms made against her.
Reasonable foreseeability
[84] It was accepted that the duty to take reasonable steps to prevent psychiatric injury
only arises if such injury is reasonably foreseeable. In relation to the issue of reasonable
foreseeability I was referred to Attia v British Gas Plc36; Fraser v State Hospitals Board for
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44
Scotland37; Hatton v Sutherland38; Barber (supra); Heartman v South Essex Mental Health and
Community Care NHS Trust39 and Yapp (supra).
[85] On the basis of the foregoing cases it was submitted that there are two categories of
case in which psychiatric harm is reasonably foreseeable. These are, first, those in which the
action taken by the employer is sufficient by itself to result in it being reasonably foreseeable
that psychiatric injury can occur. The second category was, it was submitted, where there
are specific indications relating to an individual employee which result in psychiatric harm
becoming foreseeable to the employer. Applying those propositions to the present case the
submission was that psychiatric injury was foreseeable having regard only to the
circumstances surrounding the manner in which the pursuer was treated and absent any
specific indication that she was vulnerable to developing a psychiatric reaction. Whilst that
was in itself said to be sufficient to establish foreseeability it was argued separately that they
were in any event indicators which those responsible knew or ought to have known of
which indicated the pursuer’s propensity to psychiatric harm. These indicators were said to
be present in her case by at least no later than the end of July 2011.
[86] That submission was put in the context of the facts of the present case. In that regard
the situation was said to be that by mid-April 2011 the defender knew or ought to have
known that the pursuer had considerable training, experience and specialism in the area of
undercover policing; that she was highly committed to her job, had performed to a high
standard and was respected by her peers; that she had suffered from stress at work in
1997/1998; that she had suffered from depression and anxiety between 2003 and 2005; that
37 [2001] SLT 1051 per Lord Carloway at paras 129/132
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45
the events of 6 and 7 April 2011 and their aftermath were of themselves of a stressful nature.
Having regard to that factual background the employers assumed guilt in relation to the
matters connected to DSG without any evidence of that. They placed reliance on a baseless
suspicion that the pursuer had committed fraud against SCDEA. They placed reliance upon
the pursuer accepting the offer of SCDEA accommodation made by SCDEA management in
2007. They relied upon the accumulation of those matters and decided without
investigation into any of them or giving the pursuer the opportunity to respond on a
permanent move from her post at SOU. Notwithstanding this they did not inform the
pursuer of the decision and retained her in post for a period of months. They then informed
her that she was being moved temporarily, which was incorrect. They further informed her
that her home force, Grampian, had requested her return but that they (SCDEA) had sought
to keep her. This was untrue. They advertised her post without informing her of this. They
did not inform the pursuer that she was never to return to undercover work. They never
informed her of the reason why she was permanently moved from SOU and prevented from
operating as an undercover officer.
[87] All these actings were said to show “a total lack of respect and dignity” for the
pursuer and had “no regard for the impact on [her] reputation and wellbeing”. The
submission was that these circumstances were “sufficiently egregious to render it reasonably
foreseeable that [the pursuer] would suffer from psychiatric injury”.
Causation
[88] It was accepted in order for there to be liability and damages for breach of duty the
court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the pursuer would not have
Page 46 ⇓
46
suffered psychiatric injury, or that her injury would have been less severe, had the duty been
complied with.
[89] It was submitted that the pursuer herself had stated that she been permitted to return
to SOU after her temporary move in July 2011 she would have managed to cope with that
and would have continued to work. She said she would have interpreted her return to the
SOU as a message that she had been exonerated from any wrong doing in relation to the
matters connected DSG. She considered that her colleagues would have taken a similar
understanding from her return to work. She would have had faith and trust in management
if that had occurred.
[90] The generality of that view was broadly corroborated by the evidence of Mrs Ross.
She considered that had the pursuer been permitted to return to her work after the
temporary move in July she would have experienced a full recovery from her symptoms and
been able to retain employment with the police.
[91] Taking these factors into account the submission was that there was clear evidence
that on the balance of probabilities had the pursuer been afforded fair treatment she would
not have been moved from her post and injury would have been prevented.
Defender’s submissions
[92] Senior counsel for the defender initially made submissions upon the basis of which
the defender is sued. My attention was drawn to averments in statement 2 averring that the
defender, that is the person holding the office for the time being of Chief Constable of the
Police Force of Scotland, is sued as the statutory successor to SCDEA. That averment is
subject to a qualified admission that the defender “has succeeded to certain rights and
liabilities all is provided by the Police and Fire Reform etc (Scotland) Act 2012”. In
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47
submission reference was then made to section 20 of the 2012 Act, which I have already
quoted.40 It was observed that section 39 of the 1967 Act and section 22 of the 2006 Act in
that statutory provision are the source of liabilities of Chief Constables of the police service
transferred by the provision. Section 39 of the 1967 Act has already been referred to in this
opinion.41 Section 22 of the 2006 Act is in the following terms:
“Liability for Wrongful Acts of Police Members of the Agency
(1) The Director General of the Agency is liable in reparation in respect of any
wrongful act or omission on the part of any police member in the
performance or purported performance of the member’s function in the same
manner as an employee is liable in respect of a wrongly act or omission on
the part of the employer’s employee in the course of the employee’s
employment…
(5) Any reference in this section to a police member is a reference to a person
appointed as a police member of the Agency in accordance with paragraph 7
of schedule 2.”
Reference was then made as an example of a case where a Chief Constable was held
vicariously libel in terms of section 39 of the 1967 Act to Wilson v Chief Constable of Lothian
and Borders.42 It was submitted that having regard to the foregoing statutory background
and to principles said to be explained in Wilson (supra) that in order to establish liability in
the present case the pursuer required to establish that a police officer of the former
Grampian Police came under one or other of two specific alleged duties desiderated by the
pursuer and that he or she was in breach of that duty and that the breach caused the
psychiatric illness in respect of which the pursuer sues. Alternatively a police member of
the SCDEA required to come under one or other of the said two specific alleged duties
40 Paragraph [66] hereof.
41 Paragraph [66] hereof.
42 1989 SLT 97.
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48
desiderated by the pursuer and that he or she was in breach of that duty and that breach
caused the psychiatric illness in respect of which the pursuer sues.
[93] The argument was developed by submitting that the pursuer’s case was that
Ch Supt Whitelock of SCDEA was in breach of the defender’s predecessor’s duty “not to
move her from her post, in particular, not to do so on the basis of preliminary findings
which had not been the subject of proper investigations which she had not been made aware
of and not had the opportunity to respond to.”43 The submission for the defender was that
even if Ch Supt Whitelock was under the duty desiderated, which was denied, the pursuer
had not established that at the material time he was a police member of SCDEA within the
meaning of section 22(5) of the 2006 Act. It was submitted that his evidence was that he was
an officer of Strathclyde Police. He had then been appointed Interim Director General of
SCDEA. From 1 April 2010 to January 2013 he had the role of head of intelligence in
SCDEA. His rank was that of Detective Chief Superintendent.
[94] Senior counsel for the defender submitted that so far as what she identified as the
second specific duty, that is the duty “to advise [the pursuer] that her post had been
re-advertised and provide her with an explanation therefor”44 was breached by an officer,
the identity of whom is unknown to the pursuer. The submission was that in these
circumstances the defender did not know which police force the pursuer contended the
officer was with.
[95] The defender’s submission then set forth certain propositions derived from case law
which were said to be relevant to what the pursuer required to prove in order to establish
43 Closed record page 18D/E
44 Closed record page 18D/E
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49
that each of the specific duties stated to be incumbent on a police officer of Grampian Police
or a police member of the SCDEA were.
[96] The first proposition was that foreseeability of psychiatric illness was a prerequisite
to the recovery of damages for psychiatric injury in cases based on breach of duty.
Reference was made to: Hatton v Sutherland (Barber v Somerset County Council) 45, Rorrison v
West Lothian Council 46, Fraser v State Hospitals Board for Scotland 47, Green v Argyll and Bute
Council 48, Taplin v Fife Council49, Robertson v Scottish Ministers 50, Pratt v Scottish Ministers 51
and Yapp v Foreign and Commonwealth Office (supra).
[97] The second proposition advanced drew attention to the legal effects of the
differences between physical and psychiatric injury. This element of the submission was
founded upon propositions identified in Hatton (supra). It was noted that the dividing line
between a normal but unpleasant state of mind or emotion and a recognised psychiatric
illness or disorder is not easy to draw. The causes of psychiatric illness can be complex and
depend upon the interaction between the patient’s personality and a number of factors. It is
not easy to predict who will suffer from psychiatric illness or how, why and when that may
occur. An employer should be aware of what is going on within a work place under his
control but is less aware of what is going on in an employee’s mind or with their lives
outside work. An employee may deliberately minimise or conceal true state of affairs. An
46 1999 Rep LR 102 at paragraphs 16.19 to 16.22
47 2001 SLT 1051 at 1057H
48 Unreported Lord Bonhamy 28 February 2002
49 2003 SLT 653 at 657H-I
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employer has less control over how employees choose to do their work and balance the
demands of work and life than they have over the work place. It follows that there must be
plain indications that the pursuer’s mental health is at risk before foreseeability is
established.
[98] The third proposition was that it is impermissible to reason that because a defender
has behaved unreasonably the risk of psychiatric injury should have been foreseen. In
support of this proposition reference was made to Barber (supra), Croft (supra), and Yapp
(supra) and Attia v British Gas Plc (supra). In the context of the present case, where no
evidence of bullying was adduced by the pursuer. It was submitted that it is not usually
foreseeable that even “disciplinary action which is quite seriously unfair” will result in
psychiatric injury unless there are signs of pre-existing vulnerability.52
[99] The fourth proposition was that managers often have to take decisions which will,
and will be anticipated as having, an adverse effect on employees in emotional terms but
that does not mean that a person’s manager knows or ought to anticipate that his decisions
will cause the employee to suffer psychiatric illness. In support of that proposition reference
was made to Fraser v State Hospital Board for Scotland (supra) and Yapp (supra).
[100] The fifth proposition was that even if an employer can foresee that a decision will
cause an employee to suffer psychiatric illness that does not mean that on that ground alone
he or she comes under a duty not to implement that decision. The foreseeability of
psychiatric illness does not alone give rise to a duty of care. The duty is only to take
reasonable care. It was said that in Croft (supra) the judge correctly identified that in order to
succeed the claimant had to show that it was foreseeable that unless they acted with
52 Rorrison (supra) at p248F, 248B-E
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51
reasonable care the claimant was likely to suffer a breakdown, and that her employers
caused her breakdown either by doing something no reasonable employer knowing her
vulnerability should or would have done or by failing to do something any reasonable
employer should and would have done.
[101] Against the background of those five propositions, senior counsel for the defender
then examined the case against Ch Supt Whitelock. On consideration of the evidence the
proposition was that the pursuer failed to establish that Ch Supt Whitelock made any
decision based on the Dunbar report. It was further submitted that there was no reason for
Ch Supt Whitelock to have foreseen that the pursuer being moved into witness protection in
July 2011 would cause her to suffer psychiatric illness. It was yet further submitted that
even if, which was denied, Ch Supt Whitelock could have foreseen the pursuer would
become psychiatrically unwell because she was moved in July 2011 to witness protection
that is insufficient to impose upon him the duty intended for by the pursuer.
[102] The defender’s last argument was that the duties ultimately relied upon by the
pursuer constituted a new case which it was not open to the pursuer to make. This was said
to be “not least” because it was never put to Ch Supt Whitelock that he was at fault in regard
of the matters which formed the basis, or context, of the duties relied upon.
[103] Having regard to the foregoing, the submission was that the defender was entitled to
absolvitor.
Critical examination of evidence and submissions
Liability of the defender
[104] The pursuer put in issue the responsibility of the defender for the acts and omissions
complained of in this case. The acts and omissions relied upon as constituting breach of
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52
duty are to be found in statement 6 of the closed record and have already been narrated in
paragraph [1] of this opinion. On the evidence it is, in my view, clear that those acts or
omissions were all of police officers of legacy forces, namely Strathclyde or Grampian, of the
Police Service of Scotland. The date at which the acts or omissions occurred was 2011/12 at
which time, in terms of section 39 of the 1967 Act, the Chief Constable of those police forces
was responsible for unlawful conduct on the part of any constable. Those liabilities were
transferred to the defender in terms of section 20 of the 2012 Act. Section 24 of the said Act
creates liability on the part of the defender in these circumstances.
[105] Having regard to the foregoing I am satisfied that the present defender is responsible
for any act or omission giving rise to a breach of duty which the pursuer may establish as a
matter of fact.
Duty of care
[106] The duty founded upon was to afford the pursuer fair treatment in carrying out an
investigation into her conduct and performance and support her in a move to another
department. I am satisfied that on the authority of Gogay (supra), Croft (supra) and Yapp
(supra) it is now clear that the law recognises a common law duty of fair treatment in
circumstances where the complaint is that psychiatric harm occurred to an employee. The
resultant psychiatric harm must be reasonably foreseeable. It is, further, in my view clear
that the content of the duty of care in any case will depend upon the facts and circumstances
of a given case. The approach taken by Swanwick J in Barber (supra) is accepted as an
authoritative statement of the law53.
53 Barber(supra) per Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe at paragraph 65
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53
[107] In determining whether the test adumbrated in Barber (supra) just referred to is met
the first factual issue to be determined is whether in the circumstances of the evidence in the
present case it can be said that the duty of care was breached by the defender. In
considering that issue I am of the opinion that the evidence was relatively clear. On 6 April
2011 the pursuer discovered quantities of material suggestive of either mismanagement or
wrongdoing on the part of her colleague DSG. On the same day she reported these
discoveries to her superiors. On 7 April consideration of the material by superior officers
confirmed the concerns of the pursuer. The pursuer was charged by superior officers to
assist, along with her immediate superior, in the identification of all matters of concern and
to take steps to ensure that no further damage was occasioned to SCDEA. She undertook
that task in the period between 7 April and 27 July 2011.
[108] During the course of April 2011, at an early stage in the investigation and
rectification process, Ch Supt Whitelock formed the view that the pursuer should no longer
be involved in covert operations within SCDEA. He formed the view on the basis of three
matters, those being the pursuer’s occupation of covert premises as a residential base in the
period up to, broadly, the end of 2010. Second, the pursuer’s erroneous report of the theft of
her personal property from the covert premises she was occupying and subsequent
retraction of that claim on discovery of the property. Third, the pursuer’s discovery of
DSG’s mismanagement on 6 April 2011. At the stage when Ch Supt Whitelock reached his
conclusion none of the three factors he relied upon had been investigated and reported
upon. At that stage there had been no adverse finding in relation to any of those matters
which had been determined by a body charged with investigation of them. No concerns
about any of those matters had been conveyed by either Ch Supt Whitelock or any other
member of SCDEA to the pursuer.
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54
[109] In the period between 6 April 2011 and 27 July 2011 in addition to conducting the
task she had been charged with in rectifying damage occasioned by DSG’s mismanagement
or misconduct the pursuer cooperated with an investigation carried out by the PSU of
Strathclyde Police. She was never informed of the conclusions of that investigation. No
complaint as to her conduct ever arose out of that investigation.
[110] On 27 July 2011 the pursuer was informed that she was being moved to a different
unit, witness protection, within SCDEA. The pursuer said that she was told that this was a
temporary posting. Support for this evidence came from the witness DI Rae who said that
he initially thought that it was a temporary posting. More conclusively the pursuer’s
personnel file kept by SCDEA recorded the move as a temporary posting. A number of
other witnesses were informed contemporaneously by the pursuer that she had been
temporarily moved from SOU. Ch Supt Whitelock’s position in relation to the matter was
that he did not know about it but that he would have expected it to have been a temporary
posting. I am satisfied on the evidence that the pursuer is to be believed in her evidence that
she was informed the posting was temporary. I am further satisfied on the evidence that
notwithstanding what the pursuer was told the pursuer was following the decision of
Ch Supt Whitelock being moved permanently from covert operations in SOU of the SCDEA.
The principal source of this evidence is Ch Supt Whitelock’s clear and candid statement of
the decision he made in April 2011 to which I have already adverted.
[111] Beyond these factors I am also satisfied that SOU continued, albeit on a reduced
capacity, to conduct operations after April 2007. The defender’s position on record was that
a decision was taken to close SOU following the discoveries of April 2007. It was further
averred that “[A]s the unit had closed it stopped taking new work and no longer had
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capability to deploy undercover officers.”54 The defender’s adduced no evidence to support
this proposition. It was effectively rebutted by the evidence of the pursuer and of
DS Riddoch and DSM. Ch Supt Whitelock did not state categorically that no work was
carried out by SOU after April 2011. His evidence was limited to saying that it was not
functioning properly and that he would be “surprised” if it undertook much work.
[112] My conclusion on the basis of the foregoing is that a decision was taken by
Ch Supt Whitelock that the pursuer should not, after discovery of the events in relation to
DSG’s mismanagement, ever work in SOU again. That decision was taken apparently
without consultation with any other person. It was taken on the basis of concerns, no doubt
legitimately held by Ch Supt Whitelock, but which had not been subject to objective
evaluation or scrutiny. Moreover those concerns had not been presented to the pursuer in
order to afford her an opportunity to comment thereon or, for that matter, to seek to rebut.
These considerations would, of themselves, in my view constitute a lack of fair treatment in
the context of an employee employer relationship. The matter does not however rest with
the conclusion of Ch Supt Whitelock.
[113] After Ch Supt Whitelock had reached his decision the pursuer was wrongfully, and
in my view deliberately, told that her move from SOU was temporary. She was not told that
she would not return to that posting. I am bound to conclude that she was deliberately
misled in relation to this matter. Again I am of the view that that factor constitutes a lack of
fair treatment. It follows that I consider that the pursuer has established a breach of duty in
the circumstances of this case.
54 Closed record answer 4 page 12B
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Foreseeability
[114] There was a measure of agreement in relation to the appropriate authorities in
relation to the question of foreseeability. The formulation set forth by Dillon LJ in Attia
(supra) is accepted as authoritative:
“Whether it was reasonably foreseeable to the reasonable man – whether a
reasonable onlooker, or, in the context of the present case, a reasonable gas fitter
employed by the defendant to work on the plaintiff’s house – is to be decided, not on
the evidence of psychiatrists as to the degree of probability that the particular cause
would produce the particular effect in a person of normal disposition or customary
phlegm, but by the judge, relying on his own opinion of the operation of cause and
effect in psychiatric medicine, treating himself as the reasonable man, and forming
his own view from the primary facts as to whether the chain of cause and effect was
reasonably foreseeable.”
[115] Adopting that approach I again consider that the evidence as established is relatively
clear. The pursuer was an experienced and successful police officer. By April 2011 she had
considerable experience in undercover policing. She had a previous incident of stress
associated with, at least in part, work pressure in 1997. This was known to the employing
police force who had been responsible for referring her for psychological assistance to
Mrs Ross at that time. She had a further period of depressive illness between 2003-5
following the recurrence of a serious organic illness, again this being known to the relevant
police authority.
[116] So far as the events following April 2011 were concerned I am satisfied that the initial
discovery and investigation in which the pursuer participated were stressful. In that regard
I particularly note her unchallenged evidence that at least one of the senior officers who
attended at the covert premises with her on 7 April initially accused her of having
knowledge of the mismanagement/misconduct. Moreover, albeit it may be a small factor,
there was unchallenged evidence that this senior officer was angry and kicked a chair at or
about the time he suggested the pursuer had knowledge of these matters. It appears to me
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that behaviour of this sort, no matter that it may well be understandable from a person
himself being confronted with a very difficult position, would be likely to occasion stress in
a person in the position of the pursuer as the officer responsible for the discovery.
[117] I further accept the pursuer’s evidence, again unchallenged, that she was during the
course of April 2011 interviewed by two officers from PSU. The circumstances of the
interview were that it was carried out in a police office away from her work base. It
extended over a very prolonged period, one which later caused an experienced police officer
of Grampian Police to express in evidence reservation as to its fairness. The conduct of the
interview caused the pursuer to believe, whether rightly or wrongly is in my view
immaterial, that she was being considered a suspect in the investigation.
[118] The third, and probably most significant stressor, was the transfer from SOU to
witness protection. The transfer was itself a surprise and not the subject of discussion with
the pursuer before it was effective. She was then, on the evidence I have held as proven,
misinformed as to the nature of the posting being advised it was temporary when in fact it
was permanent. She then discovered, not by official communication but by effectively being
informally told by colleagues, that her former position in SOU had been advertised. I am of
the opinion that these factors are either individually or cumulatively sufficient to satisfy the
test set down by Dillon LJ in Attia (supra).
[119] The effect of these factors on the pursuer was in my view within the knowledge of
members of SCDEA. In that regard the pursuer contacted a colleague in Grampian Police on
27 July 2011 in a state of great distress. That person arranged that steps should be taken
which culminated in a senior officer in that police force being appointed to protect or assist
the pursuer’s welfare. These persons all had knowledge in relation to the stress the process
was having on the pursuer. There is clear authority for the proposition that knowledge on
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the part of some employees in cases of stress at work is sufficient. An employer cannot rely
upon the ignorance of an individual who was the decision maker to avoid the threshold of
reasonable foreseeability.55
Causation
[120] Clear evidence was obtained from the psychologist Mrs Ross, who had provided
psychological counselling to the pursuer for a significant number of years prior to the events
of 2011. Her unchallenged evidence was that when she saw the pursuer in 2011, broadly
contemporaneously to these events, she was both distressed and suffering from significant
depressive illness. Moreover, and importantly, in response to direct and pointed
questioning she expressed the view that the most significantly harmful element
psychologically was the failure by the defender to permit the pursuer to return to
employment in SOU in the absence of any explanation why this course was being
undertaken. Mrs Ross gave, again unchallenged, evidence to the effect that had this been
permitted then the pursuer would have achieved closure. Her psychologically damaging
concerns that her professional reputation was damaged would have been obviated by such a
course. It was Mrs Ross’s opinion that had the pursuer been allowed to return to SOU she
would have made a full recovery.
[121] Having regard to that evidence and these considerations I am satisfied that there is a
causal link between the breach complained of and the injury of a psychological or
psychiatric nature sustained by the pursuer.
55 Taylor v Rover [1966] 1 WLR 1491
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[122] Having regard to the foregoing conclusions I am satisfied that the pursuer has
established the case set forth on record against the defender. The questions of causation and
liability have been answered to my satisfaction in favour of the pursuer. I will therefore
uphold the pursuer’s second plea-in-law and repel the defender’s fourth plea-in-law. As
noted at the outset of this opinion proof was restricted to the issue of liability and causation.
The case will be put out by order at a date to be intimated to discuss future procedure.